













Safety in aviation concerns managing risk rather than its elimination. This is certainly true for 
aircraft operations to, from and within the Antarctic region. This report looks to a series of 
accidents and incidents that have occurred in the Antarctic region and the operation policy aimed 
at avoiding such occurrences.1 This is not an exhaustive account of aviation accidents in the 
Antarctic. Rather, this report defines a pattern that has formed from the similarities in causative 
elements related to aircraft accidents. The trends provide an interesting insight to what factors are 
peculiar to the Antarctic region. The analysis then turns to the whether aviation safety policy is 
suitable in identifying the unique problems occurring in Antarctic aviation operations including 
recent developments in adventure tourism aviation. 
 
The Emerging Pattern 
Since 1902, when Robert Falcon Scott became the first aviator on the continent in a balloon,2 
aviation in the Antarctic has become and essential service for surveying, logistics, and search and 
rescue operations. However, since the first aviation accident in the Antarctic, operators have 
needed to address the unique operating conditions and have had to adapt accordingly.  
 
Three variables are present in any aviation incident; human, machine and the environment. Very 
rarely is one causative to the exclusion of the others. Below the categories are named along with 
an account of certain accidents that best illustrate the problems encountered. 
 
The Human Element 
The human element is affected by the other two elements of machine and the environment. 
Aircraft are complex thus increasing the heavy workload of the pilot. The polar environment can 
play tricks on the pilots ability to perceive correctly the world outside the flight deck. The flight 
crew on Air New Zealand flight TE901, 28 November 1979, were deceived by their observations 
in Lewis Bay in thinking they were cruising safely down the McMurdo Sound. The combination 
of the rising white terrain and low 2000ft cloud gave them the impression that an expansive 
1 New Zealand Civil Aviation  Regulations Part 1 define accident and incident per Annex 1 of this report as 
promulgated through the New Zealand Civil Aviation Act 1990. 
2 The balloon was affectionately called Eva after Scott’s wife. The assent took place on 4 February, 1902.  
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horizon lay before them. What in fact existed beyond the illusion was the lower slope of Mount 




The aircraft was destroyed upon impact. Flight data and cockpit voice recorder tapes indicated 
that the crew up until that moment had no idea of the approaching terrain before them. Air New 
Zealand submitted that such phenomena was rare, however the head of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry, Justice Mahon, visited the area and experienced the same conditions. He was told by 
local operators that in fact such conditions were not unlikely and those experienced by Justice 
Mahon that day were nearly identical to that which deceived the flight crew of TE901. The false 
horizon illusion coupled with the compelling effect of what they expected to see was considered a 
major contribution to the 1979 accident.3 
 
Other instances of perception difficulties occur upon the approach and touchdown phases of 
flight. In certain overcast conditions the contours of the runway disappear giving the effect of 
3 Flight 901: The Erebus Disaster, Kier Productions 1980. At the time considered the worlds fourth worst air 
disaster, Compare the findings of the Accident Report with the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Mahon. 
The former placing the blame with the pilots where Mahon determined that the blame lay squarely with the 
“administrative blunders” of Air New Zealand management. 
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landing in an eternal white abyss.4 The loss of contour perception and the characteristic surface 
of landing strips formed by snow drifts combine to create a dangerous situation during take-off or 
landing. Wind sculptured snow ridges known as sastrugi are hazardous to the landing gear due to 
high speed impact loads. In 1971 a US LC-130 BU No 148321 aborted a take-off but struck a 
sastrugi damaging the nose gear.5 In 1962, November 9, a Lockheed P2V-7P Neptune Bu No 
140439, modified with two jet engines, crashed at Wilkes Station. It had just arrived from Mirny 
Station and was taking off from the skiway, when it caught fire and crashed. Five of the nine men 
aboard were killed. The subsequent investigation reported that the Neptune was subject to stress 




Landing surfaces in the Polar regions are unique from those ordinarily encountered in ice regions 
in higher latitudes. This is because great effort is made to accommodate heavy transport aircraft 
such as C-141 Starlifters, C17 Globmaster III, and C-5 Galaxies. These airfields require constant 
maintenance and to compact the surface of up to 10 000 ft in length. The purpose of which is to 
remove sastrugis and check for crevasses. The importance of which can be supported by a 
accident ridden past.  
In the Deep Freeze operations of 
1965 the Squadron lost seven aircraft. 
A LC-47J Bu No 50778 was on its 
rollout on the skiway, when one of its 
skis struck a large sastrugi, and in 
turn striking its propeller, tearing off 
the port engine and twisting its 
fuselage. On October 6 a LC-47H Bu 
No 17239 crashed on the Ross Sea 
Ice Shelf, while practicing open field 
landings. Two months later another LC-47's Bu No 17107 main gear mount collapsed while 
4 Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 25 1998, p65. 
5 A. A. Phillips, Gateway to the Ice (2001), p81. 
6 D. Burke, Moments of Terror: The Story of Antarctic Aviation (1994), p102. 
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landing in the Horlick Mountains. The investigation board reported the cause as material failure, 
the mount not being strong enough to withstand the pressure of the sastrugi in the landing area.  
 
The Navy lost their first C-130F 
Hercules named ‘City of Christchurch’ 
in a taxing accident. The Hercules had 
just taken 7000 gallons of fuel for the 
return trip to Christchurch, but burst 
into flames, as it was taxiing around a 
building. Its left ski went over a five 
and half foot snow bank; its right wing 
hit the ground and broke between the 
two starboard engines. The fire fed by 
fuel and high winds soon engulfed the 
aircraft.   
 
Providing permanent and reliable airfields in Antarctica has always been a major problem for the 
military command, before the construction of the Blue Ice Runway, the only other runways 
regularly maintained for both ski-equipped and wheeled aircraft were located at Williams Field 
on the Ross Sea Ice Shelf.  
 
The USAF landed the C-5 Galaxy aircraft on the blue ice runway in 1989, this was the first 
aircraft of its class ever to have landed in Antarctica, and the largest to ever land on the sea-ice 
runway. Weighing some 870.000 pounds, the C-5A became a regular transport to McMurdo, 
together with the C-141, having taken over from the early the US Coast Guards, Naval shipping 
and the Douglas C-124 Globemasters. 
 
However, C-5A operation at McMurdo had not been without risk. Due to the aircraft's weight 
leaving heavy ‘footprints’ on the ice, necessitated the sea ice ramps to be constantly monitored 
for cracks. Another limitation of the Lockheed aircraft in Antarctica is the cold. The C-5A 
utilizes extensive hydraulic systems to raise and lower the fore and aft cargo doors and ramps as 
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well as the aircraft's kneeling landing gear. Whilst there are no reported incidents regarding the 
C-5 Galaxy, the size and complexity off the aircraft requires a great deal of monitoring for safe 
operation. 
 
The Air National Guard had their first C-130 # 10295 incident 
late in 1998, when the aircraft's portside ski-equipped 
undercarriage lodged down a 38 metre deep crevasse, whilst 
preparing to take off from a remote West Antarctic science field 
camp 130 km south-west of Siple Dome and 1000km from 
McMurdo. After partly filling the crevasse with snow, engineers 
used airbags and a special harness developed by Air New 
Zealand's Engineers to pull the C-130 free. Once free engineers 
working in sub zero conditions replaced an engine and two 
propellers, before being flown back to Air New Zealand 
Engineering Services in Christchurch. 
 
Wind 
Antarctica is renowned for its katabatic winds that flow down from the plateau reaching 
300km/h. Such winds create havoc on picketed aircraft. Several aircraft have been lost during 
storms where the tie-downs snap resulting in the wind flipping the aircraft, or worse, blowing it 
away. In preparation for his South Pole aerial visit 130 knots blizzard Richard E. Byrd’s Fokker 
Triplane broke from its moorings wrecking his aircraft.7  
 
These extreme winds create severe mechanical turbulence making flying extremely difficult. 
During his assent to the polar plateau on the 28th November 1929, Byrd encountered downwinds 
of such force that he was forced to ditch some of his precious cargo.8 On August 31 1957, the 
Squadron lost a UC-I Otter Bu No 142426. The aircraft had been tied down with double lines at 
Little America V, however, an 80 mph wind opened the tie-down rings blowing the Otter away.  
 
7 D Burke, Moments of Terror, (1994) p235 
8 R. Byrd, Little America : Aerial Exploration in the Antarctic, the Flight to the South Pole, (1930), p 335. 
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During the Australia National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) in 1959, the Australians 
lost three aircraft, two de Havilland Beavers (DHC 2)and a Douglas Dakota (C47) in a hurricane 
that produced winds of up to 116 mph. Despite the courageous efforts by the crews in attempting 
to ‘ground fly’ the aircraft, the decision was made to desert the aircraft. The Dakota sheared its 
15 ton fuselage cables and each of its 7 ton wing cables. It then disappeared and still has not been 
found to this day.9  The Beavers were not heavy enough to break their ties, but instead they 
disintegrated before helpless crew.10  
 
As recently as this November 2003 a British Antarctic Survey Twin Otter overturned when 
strong, gusting winds lifted the tail on landing. The aircraft was returning from a routine re-




For most aircraft the hazards of Antarctic aviation begin a long way before the southern continent 
is ever sighted. Fuel capacity is limited in the C-130 Hercules whereby a decision slightly over 
half-way must be made to either turn back or commit to a landing at McMurdo. 
 
Even after taking the precaution of assessing landing suitability, the changeable weather of 
Antarctica can thwart the best laid plans. If zero-zero conditions existed at Williams Field, for 
example, the aircraft is vectored to a pre-surveyed whiteout landing zone where there were no 
obstacles to flight within twenty miles of the selected flight path. After following pre-established 
whiteout procedures, the Antarctic aviators would commence a 100 to 200 fpm rate of descent 
with landing skies and flaps down. 
 
Despite these precautions, VX-6 Squadron's C-121 Bu No 131644 crashed during "Deep-Freeze 
70" while landing at Williams Field on the first day of the summer season. With 68 aboard 
including a crew of 12, it was the seventh aircraft to depart Christchurch for the Antarctic that 
9 Burke et al Moments of Terror: The Story of Antarctic Aviation, (1994), p207. 
10 Ibid. 
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season. Some half-hour before arriving, the weather suddenly deteriorated to zero visibility in a 
blinding snowstorm. 
 
With no other alternative airfield, and the aircraft low on fuel, the pilot made several low-level 
radar controlled approaches, all unsuccessful. On the last attempt, and with almost no fuel left, he 
landed, veered off to the right of the runway. The C-121 was seriously damaged, without any 
injuries.  
 
Visibility is not solely impaired by the blizzard type conditions. The low temperatures of the 
aircraft windscreen cause any moister to super-cool and freeze on contact thus impairing the 
pilots view. A Sikorsky helicopter was lost on July 12 1957 when a VX-6 HO4-3 Bu No 138580 
returning to McMurdo crashed short of base. The windscreen frosted and the visibility suddenly 
worsened from ice crystals in the Antarctic air. The lack of vision cause spatial disorientation that 
resulted in the pilot over-flaring and settling the machine on its tail. The helicopter burst into 
flames causing severe burns to three of the passengers seated in the cabin suffered severe burns. 




The extreme environment and high surface altitudes on which the aircraft operate necessitates 
unusual measures to assure adequate performance. The use of JATO (jet assisted take-off) 
rockets have a dramatic effect on take-off performance. The rockets are attached to the fuselage 
and fired in banks near take-off speed to provide thrust augmentation. The use of such devices in 
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the Antarctica began during “Operation High Jump 1” (1946-47).11 The operation was a large US 
Navy deployment led by the now Admiral Byrd consisting of 4700 men. The JATO rockets were 




JATO rockets were instrumental in the successful completion of the first aircraft to land at the 
geographical South Pole On October 31, 1956 an the R4D named "Que Sera Sera" (what will be, 
will be).13 The aircraft was sitting on the ground subject to –50ºC temperatures compounded by a 
10-15 knot wind. After approximately 50 minutes the decision was made to leave. However, the 
R4D's skis during the landing heated a few degrees from the friction causing the snow to melt, 
subsequently freezing to the skis. At 9,200 feet, the engines had insufficient power to ‘unstick’ 
the skis. Consequently, fired all the JATO bottles were fired in order to avoid an unscheduled and 
potentially fatal stay at the pole.   
 
This historic expedition was a valuable lesson in the unique problems encountered by aircraft and 
crew in the plateau regions of Antarctica. The combination of increased surface altitudes and the 
effects of the Southern Ocean swirl were to produce ground temperatures never experienced 
before. 
 
11 Named Task Force 68 comprising of 13 ships and 23 aircraft. 
12 Naval classification for Dakota DC-3 also has another military classification C-47. 
13 Piloted by Captain William Hawkes and co-pilot Lieutenant Conrad Shinn. 
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Since then the use of JATO bottles became commonplace but not without their associated 
accidents. A LC-47H Bu No 50777, while making a jet assisted take-off at Davis Glacier, was 
written off after a JATO bottle was released 
prior to it being extinguished hitting the 
aircraft's propeller. On October 22 19%% a 
LC-47H Bu No 12407 crashed when one of 
its JATO canisters was inadvertently fired 
while being jettisoned. Striking the left prop, 




In “Deep Freeze 72”, VXE-6 lost 
their second C -130F Bu No 148321 
landing in an open ice field to supply 
a French traverse team participating 
in the International Glaciological 
Project. After unloading, the C-130F 
made the usual JATO take off before 
returning to McMurdo 750 nautical miles away, however when the pilot had reached 50 feet, two 
of the bottles separated from the left hand side, striking the left inward engine and prop. The 
aircraft sustained serious damage on impact with the ice.14 
 
JATO bottles, even without the accidental detachment, pose hazards. Just before the 73-74 season 
finish on January 15, a C-130R Bu No 148319 made a forced landing after a JATO bottle 
exploded. The crew was 600 miles from McMurdo and eagerly awaited rescue. To their dismay, 
the rescue C-130 Bu No 159129 nose ski collapsed while taking off with the aircrew and 
passengers on board. Both aircraft were not recovered until 1979. 
 
14 The abandoned aircraft was retrieved from its frozen resting-place in December 1986 after 16 years, repaired and 
returned to Antarctic service. 
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Aviation Safety Policy 
As discussed above, aviation operations in the Antarctic and the associated risk are inseparable. 
Whilst minimising the risk is paramount, managers must accept the realities of working in the 
Antarctic. Indeed, the words “Safety enhancement” rather than “accident prevention” are 
considered more appropriate.15 To take a conservative approach would undermine the utility of 
the vital services that aircraft operations provide.16 Policy has taken a common sense approach in 
the context of accepting the additional risk the Antarctic affords but adapting safety policy to 
promote best practices. 
 
Safety policy in the US programme took the form of the VX6 Air Operations Manual (AOM).17 
The manual contained comprehensive detail on procedures to be followed whilst around and 
operating the UH-1N helicopters and C-130 Hercules aircraft. Specific attention is given to 
operating in the polar region defined as regions greater than 60º latitude. Minimum crews are 
provided for and the survival equipment to be taken.18 Minimum training standards are required 
for ground handling and “hot refueling”.19 Of note is the attention given to flying in whiteout 
conditions or poor surface definition.20 
 
Section 6 of the AOM covers search and rescue and lost communications. Strict requirements 
govern the authorisation of any aircraft movement. Except for local helicopter flights, no aircraft 
may operate without another craft being available capable of carrying out search and rescue. This 
includes Christchurch to McMurdo flights.21 The annexes to the AOM contain a list of polar 
phenomena and ways to minimize its effects on aircrew. Annex B lists Specially Protected Areas 
(SPA) and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) for aircraft to avoid the environmental risks 
in cases of emergency landing.  
 
15 G. Hughes ‘Accident Prevention –A Regulators View’ p29 cited in 33rd Annual International Air Safety Seminar, 
Sep 1980 Christchurch NZ. Flight Safety Foundation, 1980. 
16 See for example the Winfly operations conducted by both the US and RNZAF for the medical evacuation of 
critically ill persons. Antarctic Vol. 17 No 1 August 1999, Antarctic, Vol. 18, No 3 & 4, 2001. 
17 Ref Antarctic Deveron Six INST 3710.7H Air Operations Manual. 
18 Ibid 22, 23. 
19 Refueling whilst engines are still operating. 
20 Above note 17, p31. 
21 The exception being that an aircraft may proceed beyond the point of safe return if the follow up flight is aborted, 
p48. 
 11 
                                                 
The current operator, the Air National Guard, began taking over the roll of U.S. air logistics from 
the VX-6 in the 1998-99 season. The high degree of Antarctic focused safety policy has 
continued with strict maintenance regimes continuing to include regular inspection of the landing 
gear particularly of the nose ski that is critical to safe operation.22 
 
Antarctic Treaty  
At the Treaty level23 the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) was 
established to review operational matters and to exchange information and cooperation with 
SCAR. Under COMNAP the Standing Committee on Antarctic Logistics and Operations 
(SCALOP) was established.24 The question of aviation safety was discussed in depth at the 
XVIth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ACTM). Having recalled the recommendation 
XV-20 from the last meeting held in Paris that was implemented by COMNAP and SCALOP, 
certain policies were established. All measures implemented were to be on the basis of the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) criteria. Emphasis is placed on standardization 
of practices and procedures and the creation of an Antarctic Flight Information Manual that 
promulgates such information including information on aircraft, airfields, and areas of national 
operations. Russia considered special measures should be taken on air traffic control procedures 
and the use of airspace. Recommendation XV-20 recognised the increasing problems that are 
associated with increased air traffic. Measures recommended were the sharing of proposed 
aircraft movements from each national program. Members have welcomed the advance in 
emergency locater transmitter technology as a necessary incorporation to aircraft inventories 
during Antarctic operations.25 
 
The treaty system relies heavily on national driven implementation of domestic aviation 
regulations. The recommendations however are without a specific date for incorporation and thus 
it appears uncertain when the measures will actually be effective. 
 
22 Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 1998, p73-74. Damage to the nose ski can result in serious and 
potentially fatal consequences if not regularly examined. 
23 Antarctic Treaty 1959. 
24 The terms of reference of each group are reproduced in the Antarctic Treaty Handbook (2002) pp238-239. 
25 Such devises operate on 406mhz and transmit both the emergency signal and the location of the aircraft. 
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Antarctic Tourism 
The above recommendations of XV-20, whilst recognising the increase of aviation traffic, make 
no mention of non-governmental operations. Recognised tourist operators must comply with 
International Association of Antarctic Tourist Operators (IAATO) guidelines. However, recent 
years have seen an increase in private aviation expeditions involving single engine aircraft and 
some with disastrous results.26 Government organisations are reluctant to assist adventure tourists 
other than in emergencies. For example, in 2002 14 people were stranded at the South Pole after 
the Antonov 3 aircraft was grounded. The government officials were airlifted immediately whilst 
the remaining non-governmental officials had to negotiate their way out tot the tune of 
US20,000.27  
 
The reluctance to assist is complicated by the fact that there seems little or no attention given to 
the required state of preparedness prior to these private expeditions being undertaken. The degree 
of preparation is up to the discretion of the individual concerned. Recently in December 2003, a 
private adventurer Jon Johanson, flew down to the continent from Invercargill landing at 
McMurdo. He then requested both Scott Base and the United States to assist in the uplift of 400 
litres of fuel. Press reports communicated Johanson’s surprise at the US and NZ bases refusal to 
help. An international incident loomed with State officials exchanging words over the stance 
taken by the US and NZ programs. However, before the incident further escalated, Johanson was 
offered fuel from another private venture that was cancelled.28  
 
Johanson’s actions clearly demonstrate an emerging concern in Antarctic aviation safety. There 
are no regulations providing for minimum preparations and contingency plans. Although 
Johanson filed flight plan, it was of little use because he did not alert any officials in the region 
that he was in fact transiting. Clearly, there should be provision for authorised transit and 
declarations of contingency plans. These requirements could be promulgated through national 
Civil Aviation Regulations consistent with ICAO and thus commensurate with the current 
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
26 Antarctic, Vol. 20 No 3 & 4, 2003, p29, Frenchman Henri Choroz in a single engine homebuilt Glasair; Antarctic 
Vol. 21 No. 1 & 2 , 2003, p33 British woman Polly Vacher in a Piper Dakota.  
27 Antarctic Vol. 19, No 3 & 4 2002 p153. 
28 Polly Vacher cancelled her planned trip and made available her fuel that was stored at Scott Base. 
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Conclusion 
As discussed, the short aviation history of Antarctica has had an array of accidents of which the 
causes are closely related to the continent’s unique environment. The occurrences of whiteout 
and loss of perception have an adverse affect on the pilot performance. The conditions to which 
the aircraft are subjected are equally difficult. Low temperatures, rough landing surfaces, sticking 
skis and high altitude operations have placed extreme demands on the aircraft performance. 
JATO modifications incorporated to overcome operational obstacles have introduced dangers of 
their own. 
 
However, such risks are an inevitable consequence of operating in the Antarctic. Whilst fatalities 
are not acceptable, the reality for safety policy makers is the management of risk rather than its 
illumination. COMNAP, set up by the Antarctic Treaty System, has provided clear safety policy 
guidelines for governmental organisations. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for non-
governmental organisations. The increase in aviation adventure traffic requires that a review is 
urgently needed for NGO operator standards.  Procedures on preparation and contingency plans 
should be mandatory and enforced at a national level by the country of departure. Only once 
specific NGO aviation policy is developed will all parties involved understand exactly where 
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